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UNNAMED PLAINTIFFS IN FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:
ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. FURTHER RESTRICTS THE
AVAILABILITY OF THE CLASS SUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris1 severely
limited the availability of class actions in federal courts for cases in which
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.2 The Court held that
members of a rule 23(b)(3)3 class may not aggregate their claims to
satisfy the statutory requirement that the matter in controversy exceed
$10,000. 4 In late 1973 the Court went even further, holding in Zahn
v. International Paper Co.5 that each member of the class-named or
unnamed-in a diversity action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount to
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court. These decisions have
rendered it virtually impossible to bring a class action in federal court
when a minimum amount in controversy is required as a jurisdictional
predicate. It is the purpose of this note to demonstrate that the decisions
were not compelled by precedent or analysis and that the Court could
have reached the opposite results on sound legal grounds. Such results
would have given effect to the goals of the class action device and to
the purpose of the 1966 revisions of rule 23. To develop this thesis,
the note will explore the historical bases of the aggregation rule and
then discuss and analyze the rationale of the two principal Supreme Court
cases which articulate the rule as applied to class action suits. After
that the focus will shift, and the note will consider the negative impact
of the present standard on various types of litigation. The note concludes
that the present application of the rule was not compelled or supported
by precedent and suggests that legislative action be taken to alleviate the
problems which will arise.
II. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE AGGREGATION
OF CLAIMS RULE IN CLASS ACTIONS
A. The Basic Aggregation Rule
A federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity
1394 U.S. 332 (1969).
228 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
3 Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes the use of a class action when the common questions of law or
fact predominate over matters peculiar to the individual members and when a class action is
determined by the court to be the best available method to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the
Controversy.
4 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
594 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
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of citizenship case8 or a general federal question case only if "the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... ." Class action
and joinder devices, permitted in appropriate cases by rules 23 and 20,
respectively, allow multiple parties, often with multiple claims, to sue
or be sued in a single action. If each party satisfies the minimum amount
in controversy or if jurisdiction is invoked under a statute not requiring
a minimum amount, the court may proceed to determine whether a class
action or joinder is appropriate. However, if some or all of the parties
do not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, the question becomes
whether the statute can be satisfied by aggregating the claims of all the
parties.
There is no dispute as to the basic scope of the aggregation rule,8
and the rule is easily stated. The jurisdictional amount in controversy
requirement will be satisfied by aggregating claims of multiple plaintiffs
if the claimants have a common and undivided interest in the action;
however, it will not be met by aggregating separate and distinct claims.'
In other words, aggregation is permitted in compulsory joinder cases
where the rights asserted are joint, but not in cases of permissive joinder
where such rights are several. Despite the general agreement as to the
basic principle involved, no criteria have been developed to allow predic-
tion of the outcome of certain types of cases. The permissibility of aggre-
gation can be easily determined once the character of the rights involved
in the litigation has been determined. However, serious problems have
arisen in trying to ascertain whether the rights sought to be enforced
are joint or several.
This difficulty can be illustrated by a brief comparison of two cases
which reached opposite results on almost identical facts. In Ruissell v.
Stansell,'0 several taxpayers representing a class consisting of all taxpayers
within an assessment district sought to enjoin collection of an assessment.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
8 This rule has come from three joinder cases, Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet)
143 (1832); Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); and Pinel v.
Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
9 Aggregation was permitted where the holders of two notes, secured by a single vendor's
lien, sued to assert the lien, Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911);
where creditors sued to collect fire insurance payable to their debtor, Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Woosley, 287 F.2d 531 (10th Cit. 1961); and in a suit to require that a fund be created
for the benefit of a class, Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, Inc., 414 F.2d 311 (lst
Cir. 1969). Aggregation was not permitted where several landowners sued to enjoin an
assessment for street improvements, Wheless v. City of Si Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901);
and where several policyholders of an insurance company sought a declaration of their rights
under their policies, Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cetr.
denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
10 105 U.S. 303 (1881).
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The total amount in question was well over the required jurisdictional
amount, but none of the plaintiffs individually could have been liable
for an assessment amount equal to the jurisdictional minimum. The Su-
preme Court held that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs were separate
and distinct and therefore could not be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount. However, in a later case with similar facts, the Court
permitted aggregation. In Brown v. Trousdale'," a group of taxpayers
of a county in Kentucky sought, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, to enjoin collection of a tax and to prohibit future
levies. The argument that such multiple claims were separate and dis-
tinct because of the potential individual liability of each claimant was
rejected, and the Court held that the jurisdictional requirement had been
satisfied because -[t]he amount in dispute, in view of the main contro-
versy, far exceeded the limit upon our jurisdiction ....
These cases are typical of the inconsistent applications of the aggrega-
tion rule. Both Russell and Brown were cases in which injunctive relief
was sought, and the plaintiffs in each had a distinct liability at stake.
Nevertheless, aggregation was permitted in one but not the other.
Neither Court disputed the general aggregation rule, but each reached
a different conclusion as to whether the rights sought to be enforced
were joint or several. Russell viewed each claim as a separate contro-
versy, while Brown regarded the controversy as encompassing the claims
of all the plaintiffs.
B. Aggregation and Rule 23
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938,
rule 23 was intended to be a restatement of the law of class actions
as it then existed. 13  The rule extended the use of the class action device
to all civil actions and authorized representatives of a class to sue or
be sued in federal court when the character of the rights sought to be
enforced was
(1) joint, or common, or secondary . . . ; (2) several, and the object of
the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action; or (3) several, and there is a common
question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief
is sought.14
These enumerated types of class actions came to be known as "true,"
11 138 U.S. 389 (1891).
121d. at 394.
1 3 ADVISORY CoMMTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, RnPoRT 58 (1937).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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"hybrid," and "spurious," respectively.15 When an action was brought
as a class suit, the courts tended to be more concerned with deciding
which of these categories described the action than with confronting the
more basic question of whether class action treatment was appropriate
on the facts involved. Once the designation was affixed, various conse-
quences, such as the permissibility of aggregation of claims, the effect
of the statute of limitations on the absent members of the class, the pos-
sibility of intervention, and the binding effect of the judgment, flowed
from that determination.'
Prior to 1966, the general aggregation rule under rule 23 was that
claims could be aggregated in a true class action but not in a hybrid
or spurious class action.17  But the original rule 23 did not resolve the
difficulties experienced by courts in applying the aggregation rule. The
categorization of a class action as true, hybrid, or spurious depended on
categorization of the rights sought to be enforced as joint-common or
several. These terms "proved obscure and uncertain,"18 and courts con-
tinued to have difficulty applying them to concrete cases.10
III. AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS: SNYDER V. HARRIS
Rule 23 was completely rewritten when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were revised in 1966.20 The amended rule eliminated the
'5 3B J. MOORE, FEDEAL PRACrICE 5 23.30 (1969).
16See Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of
Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. ANlnTRUsT L.J. 254 (1966); Developments, Multiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874 (1958); see note 9 supra.
'7E.g., Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F.2d 527 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (aggregation allowed); Matlaw Corp. v. War Damage Corp.,
164 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1947) (aggregation not allowed). See
generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756 (1972).
18 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).
19 See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939),
rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on reand, 39 F. Supp.
592 (E.D. Pa. 1941), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Deckerr, 123
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
20 383 U.S. 1031 (1966). The text of the new rule 23, FED. K. CIv. P. 23, is as follows:
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequa:ely protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to indi-
1974]
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joint-several rights distinction as well as the necessity to "pigeonhole"
the action into one of the three categories. The rule established practi-
cal guidelines and gave the district judge substantial discretion in deter-
mining whether class action treatment was desirable. In addition, the
anomaly of a spurious class action, which was not really a class action
at all because it did not adjudicate the rights of anyone not before the
court, was eliminated. Furthermore, the amended rule provided that un-
der subsection (b) (3) all the non-appearing members of the class were to
be included in the judgment unless they took affirmative steps to exclude
vidual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members nor parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or de.
fense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class ac.
tion.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be .Maintained; Notice; Judg.
ment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall di-
rect to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favor-
able or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom notice provided In sub-
division (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the
court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be con.
strued and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule ap-
plies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceed.
ings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the pres-
entation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
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themselves.2 1  Elimination of the joint-several terminology, which was
the basis of the aggregation decisions, suggested that the amendment
might have also changed the applicability of the aggregation doctrine
in class actions. But conflicting decisions by courts of appeals after the
adoption of the amended rule indicated that the courts were unable to
determine the exact effect.
In Alvarez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co.,'2 a diversity action
brought under new rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment of rights under insurance contracts on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated (Cuban nationals holding life insurance contracts
with the defendant). Although the aggregate claims of all the members
of the class would have exceeded the jurisdictional requirement, the plain-
tiff's individual claim or stake in the matter did not. The Fifth Circuit
refused to permit aggregation and found that the amount in controversy
did not exceed $10,000. The court reasoned that amended rule 23 could
not abandon the traditional "separate and distinct claims" doctrine with-
out violating rule 82,1 which provides that the rules cannot extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts.
However, in Gas Service Co. v. Coburn,24 also a rule 23(b) (3) di-
versity action, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Alvarez decision.
Plaintiff, a customer of the gas company, brought a class action on behalf
of himself and all other customers similarly situated. The individual
claim of the named plaintiff amounted to $7.81, but the total claims
of all members of the class exceeded $10,000. The court acknowledged
that the claims were separate and distinct and that aggregation would
not have been permitted had the action been brought under the old rule
23. However, the court permitted aggregation and decided that the
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. The court reasoned that the
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of ab-
sent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar pro-
cedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and
may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class as the court directs.
21 FED. I. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). This right to "opt oute, of the class applies only to 23(b)(3)
class actions.
223 75 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
23 FaD. R. CIV. P. 82.
24 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cit. 1968), ret'd sub now. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
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purpose of rule 23, as amended, was to eliminate the "character of the
rights" classification and concluded that the amount in controversy should
now be determined by the total amount of all claims to be adjudicated
in a class action. The court stated:
These terms [joint, common, etc.] were eliminated in the amendment
and a purely pragmatic classification was adopted. The rule now recog-
nizes that the procedural tool of a class action must be workable if it is
to be desirable. To now hold that the former classifications of "true,"
"hybrid" and "spurious" must be perpetuated to allow or defeat aggre-
gation would seem to render the rule sterile in that regard25
Faced with the same issue, the Eighth Circuit in Snyder v, 1Iarris0
followed the Alvarez decision and denied aggregation in a rule 23
(b) (3) class action in which jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of
citizenship. In Snyder, the named plaintiff, a shareholder in an insurance
company, brought suit on behalf of herself and a class of shareholders
against members of the board of directors of the company. The named
plaintiff alleged damages to herself of only $8,740, but the total claims
against the defendant by members of the class amounted to approximate-
ly $1,200,000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
the conflict between the circuits.2 7  In affirming Snyder and reversing
Gas Service Co., the Court held that the interpretation of "matter in con-
troversy" had not been changed by the revision of rule 23.28 Justice
Black, writing for the majority, first referred to the "traditional judicial
interpretation" of the jurisdictional statutes, that is, separate and distinct
claims cannot be aggregated to satisfy the minimum dollar requirement.
Noting that this interpretation was based on a statutory construction of
the phrase "matter in controversy" and not on old rule 23, he stated
that the revision should have no effect on the interpretation. 9 Further,
he reasoned, if the amended rule did purport to change the aggregation
rules it would violate rule 82.30
In Snyder the representative plaintiffs had urged that the amount in
controversy should be measured by the aggregate of the claims of the
entire class on the ground that the judgment in the class action would
include all the members, whether or not before -the court, except those
who asked to be excluded. The Court rejected this argument, noting
that the judgment in a permissive joinder case was also binding on all
25 389 F.2d at 834.
26 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), a/Id, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
27393 U.S. 911 (1968).
28 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
29 Id. at 336.
80 1d. at 337.
(Vol. 3
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parties and that the traditional aggregation doctrine had been first articu-
lated in joinder cases.3 ' Furthermore, the Court declined an invitation
to re-evaluate its earlier construction of "matter in controversy," reasoning
that it was precluded from doing so because Congress had on several
occasions re-enacted the jurisdictional statutes to change the minimum
- amount required and on each occasion had left the "matter in contro-
versy" language unchanged. The majority thought that Congress must
have implicitly relied upon the Court's historically consistent construction
of these statutes in setting the jurisdictional amount and concluded that
construction had become tantamount to a legislative enactment rather
than a judge-made rule.32  In response to the argument that the joint-
several terminology had resulted in needless litigation and uncertainty,
the majority noted simply that the lower courts had developed "largely
workable standards" for determining whether claims were joint (aggre-
gable) or several (not aggregable).S
The Court's decision in Snyder v. Harris has been widely criticized
by commentators.3 4 The reasoning of the opinion is less than compel-
ling, and many critics have complained that the decision undermines
much of what the drafters of the revised rule tried to accomplish. The
following discussion will identify the analytical infirmities of the opinion.
Justice Black believed that the legislature had implicitly ratified the
judicial construction of "matter in controversy," which prohibited aggre-
gation of separate and distinct claims. If Congress had in fact done
so, then the suggested effect of amended rule 23 (allowing aggregation
in all class actions) would indeed expand the jurisdiction of federal courts
in violation of rule 82. In effect, the diversity statute would be read
to state that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over a group
of separate and distinct claims, each of which is for $10,000 or less,
and this could not be changed by the rule. But this argument stands
or falls with the initial assumption of implicit legislative approval.
There is no authoritative support for the position that Congress im-
plicitly considered and adopted the Court's statutory construction when
31 Id. at 337.
3 2 Id. at 338-39.
33 Id. at 341.
34 See, e.g., 7, 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC"ICE AND PROCEDURE §§
1756, 1782 (1972); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of
jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L REv. 601 (1969); Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note to the Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COa. L REV. 497 (1969), Com-
ment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control
Pollution, 16 WAYNE L REV. 1085 (1970); Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation
of Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L J. 1577 (1970).
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it re-enacted the jurisdictional statutes. 0 The Snyder Court presumed
adoption from silence, but it is equally possible that Congress, by its
silence, specifically intended to refrain from adopting the Court's con-
struction. In his dissenting opinion Justice Fortas noted that the Court
was departing from its earlier position concerning congressional silence.
Quoting from an earlier Supreme Court opinion,10 he noted:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congression-
al silence to debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines. It is
at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of
a controlling rule of law .... The silence of Congress and its inaction
are as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid as they are with
an adoption by silence of the rule of those cases.87
The majority in Snyder conceded the hazards of presuming adoption by
congressional silence, and it is questionable whether any "very persua-
sive circumstances" were present in Snyder. In fact, the uncertainties
and difficulties courts have had working with the terms "joint and com-
mon" and "separate and distinct" suggest that Congress would not want
to adopt an interpretation which had proven so difficult to administer.
Commentators have called upon the Court to redefine "matter in con-
troversy" in a way that would be appropriate to the present day context
of class actions.88 It is possible, though, that the traditional interpreta-
tion is flexible enough to permit aggregation of claims in properly
brought class actions. In Snyder the Court indicated that the judicial
interpretation of "matter in controversy" has been consistent at least since
the decision in Oliver v. Alexander0 in 1832.40 Oliver involved claims
for wages by a number of seamen against the assets of the ship owner.
None of the individual claims exceeded the required jurisdictional
-amount, and the Court refused to aggregate the claims to satisfy the re-
quirement because each seaman had an independent contract with the
ship owner, making his claim separate and distinct. The Court stated:
Each is to stand or fall by the merits of his own claim and is unaffected
by those of his co-libellants. The defence which is good against one
seaman, may be wholly inapplicable to another. One may have been
paid; another may not have performed the service; and another may have
forfeited in whole or in part his claim to wages.41
35 See H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
36 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).
37 394 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
as See note 34 supra.
89 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
40 394 U.S. at 339.
4131 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 146.
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The Court apparently felt that it was improper to treat all the daims
as a whole for jurisdictional purposes when each claim would probably
require individual attention to resolve the issues peculiar to it. Questions
affecting only individual claimants seem to have outweighed any ques-
tions common to all the seamen, and for that reason the court refused
to permit aggregation. But this same issue can be resolved today without
even reaching the problem of aggregation, since under amended rule
23(b) (3) an action can be brought as a class action only if, inter alia,
:'questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members . *. .. , Since
aggregation cases subsequent to Oliver also emphasized the issue of sepa-
rate and distinct claims,43 none of these cases should be regarded as con-
trolling precedent for a rule 23 (b) (3) class action where common issues
must predominate over individual issues.
In diversity of citizenship cases (and, by extension, possibly in general
federal question cases) Snyder has frustrated the intent of amended rule
23 to approach the class action question on a more practical, functional
basis. As noted by the Advisory Committee, the intent was to eliminate
the necessity of determining the ambiguous "nature of the rights sought
to be enforced." Class action treatment is now permitted if practical
considerations indicate that it is the most desirable way of adjudicating
the dispute.44
As a consequence of Snyder, in cases where the jurisdictional mini-
mum is applicable, in addition to determining whether class action treat-
ment is appropriate under rule 23, the district judge must still determine
whether the rights asserted are joint or several. The majority in Snyder
offered no guidance to lower courts in identifying the "largely workable
standards" to which it refers, and thus a problem which the new rule
was intended to eliminate will persist.4 5
Under old rule 23, the judgment in a spurious class action would
have bound only those persons who affirmatively took part in the suit.
The two actions involved in Snyder, however, were brought under the
amended rule. Unlike the old rule, amended rule 23 provides that
4 2 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
43 See cases cited Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336.
44 The court must find "that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. PL CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule
lists factors to be considered in this determination.
45 Courts had difficulty in determining the character of the rights asserted in a class
action before Snyder. See text accompanying notes 10-12 rupre. The majority opinion
in Snyder did not resolve the difficulty. Therefore, it is not anticipated that the lower
courts will be any better able to make this determination after Snyder.
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the judgment in a (b) (3) action will bind all members of the class to
whom notice was directed and who have not requested exclusion from
the class."' The Court in Snyder noted that the binding effect of a (b) (3)
class action is similar to that of a proceeding where parties have been
permissively joined.47  It said this similarity precludes aggregation in a
(b) (3) class action, since permissively joined claims may not be aggre-
gated. However, the Court's analysis fails to recognize the distinction
suggested by the change in the provisions of rule 23. While permissive
joinder and class actions have similar res judicata effects, they are essen-
tially different in nature. Rule 20 permits individuals in certain circum-
stances to join in a single action, but they remain individual plaintiffs
and judgment will be rendered for or against each individually. Rule
23 (b) (3), on the other hand, treats a class of individuals as a unit and
requires members to take affirmative action to remove themselves from
the class if they do not wish to be included in and bound by the judg-
ment. Judgment is rendered for or against the class as a whole, and
damages are distributed by the court, after payment of appropriate costs
and fees.
Therefore, in an action on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, even though
each might have a specific monetary stake in the dispute, it would be
appropriate to measure the amount in controversy by the size of the judg-
ment that could be obtained against the defendant if the plaintiff class
prevails. Such an interpretation of the statutory language would be com-
patible with the new procedural context and would not be a roadblock
to implementation of the procedures available under amended rule 23.
In Snyder, for example, the class of shareholders sought a judgment
amounting to over $1,000,000. Holding that this amount satisfies the
jurisdictional requirement would not be inconsistent with the supposed
legislative intent in establishing an amount in controversy requirement
to keep trivial diversity cases out of the federal courts. Aggregation is
permissible in situations involving a single plaintiff who has two or more
separate and distinct claims against the same defendant.48 It would seem
to require less stretching of the "matter in controversy" language to allow
aggregation in a class action, where the claims of all the plaintiffs are
similar, than to allow aggregation of unrelated claims by a single claim-
ant.
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3); see note 21 supra.
4 7 FED. R. Civ. P. 20.




ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.
In neither of the two cases consolidated in Snyder did an individual
plaintiff allege damages of more than $10,000; therefore, the question
raised in both was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the action. The Supreme Court answered this question emphat-
ically in the negative, holding that the separate and distinct claims of
the plaintiffs could not be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement. Snyder clearly restricted the use of the class action in fed-
eral courts (except under jurisdictional statutes not requiring a minimum
amount in controversy), but it was not known how far reaching this
restriction would be. The Court's opinion left at least one important
question unanswered: Would the result have been different if one or
more, or all, of the representative plaintiffs had individually satisfied the
jurisdictional amount? The Supreme Court provided the answer to this
question in Zahn v. International Paper Co.49 In this case the Court
further restricted the availability of class actions by holding that the juris-
dictional amount must be satisfied by each member of the class where
the claims are not jointly held.
A. The Decision of the District Court
The named plaintiffs in Zahn were four Vermont landowners whose
property fronted on Lake Champlain. On behalf of themselves and ap-
proximately two hundred other lakefront property owners, they sought
to recover damages from the defendant, a New York corporation, which
plaintiffs alleged had seriously polluted the lake with industrial dis-
charges. Jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship, and the
action was brought as a class action under rule 23 (b) (3). Each of the
named plaintiffs alleged that their property had been damaged by the
actions of the defendant in an amount exceeding $10,000. There were
no allegations as to the damages sustained by the unnamed members
of the class.50
Before considering whether the action could be maintained as a class
action under rule 23(b)(3), the district court first determined that it
had jurisdiction over the claims of the representative plaintiffs because
each sought damages in excess of $10,000 and none was a citizen of
New York. However, the court felt certain that not every member of
the class had a claim for more than $10,000 and thought that Snyder
4 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
50 Id. at 507.
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precluded it from exercising jurisdiction over those unnamed members
of the class whose individual claims did not satisfy the amount in contro-
versy requirement." As the district court read Snyder, the only class
over which it could take jurisdiction would be one comprised of all lake-
front property owners having individual damage claims in excess of
$10,000. The district judge, exercising his discretion under rule 23(b)-
(3), refused to allow the class action because of the overriding problems
involved in identifying the members of such a class.52
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting,58 and the United
States Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, hold-
ing that "[ejach plaintiff in a rule 23(b) (3) class action must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dis-
missed from the case . . ."I' Justice White, writing for a six-three
majority, stated that the Court's prior cases construing the jurisdictional
statutes governed the instant case. Citing Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead
& Co.,56 Scott v. Frazier,57 Clark v. Paul Gray, inc.,58 and two nineteenth
century cases,59 he repeated the traditional rule that separate and distinct
claims of multiple plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount. Further, the Court was convinced that the Snyder ratio-
nale was controlling, although it acknowledged that the facts of Snyder
were distinguishable from those in Zahn.00 Thus it declined to overrule
Snyder or to re-examine its construction of the "matter in controversy"
language in the jurisdictional statutes. As in Snyder, the Court referred
to congressional re-enactment of the statutes as a bar to a judicial change
in the construction.('
5153 F.R.D. at 431-32.
521d. at 433.
53 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
54 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
55 94 S. Ct. at 512.
56222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
57253 U.S. 243, 244 (1920).
58306U.S. 583 (1939).
59 Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1885); Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109
U.S. 341, 355 (1883).
60 94 S. Ct at 511.
611d. at 512.
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C. Analysis of Precedents and Rationale Relied Upon by the Court
The cases relied upon by the Court in reaching its decision do not
compel or support the result in Zahn. Each presented a different ques-
tion than the Court dealt with in Zahn, and each is distinguishable either
on its facts or in its holding, or both. For example, the majority relied
heavily on Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.6 2 The Court thought that Clark was
particularly relevant because the Court there had retained jurisdiction
over the one claimant who satisfied the jurisdictional amount but had
dismissed all the other claims.' In contrast, however, all of the representa-
tive or named plaintiffs in Zahn satisfied the jurisdictional amount--only
some of the unnamed plaintiffs had not. 3  In Clark there is no indication
that there even were any unnamed plaintiffs. Nor is it clear from the
record that Clark was in fact brought as a class action,"' although the
Supreme Court treated it as one. Thus Clark should have been read
merely to hold that the claims of representative plaintiffs who are before
the court must be dismissed if they do not individually satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount. Clark does not compel similar treatment of the claims
of unnamed plaintiffs in a class action. 5
Zahn also relied upon a Second Circuit case, Hackner v. Guaranty
Trust Co.," which is also distinguishable on its facts from Zahn. Hack-
ner involved a spurious class action under old rule 23 (a) (3). None of
the plaintiffs named in the complaint satisfied the jurisdictional amount.
When the plaintiffs later attempted to amend the complaint to add the
name of a plaintiff who had a claim of sufficient size, the Second Circuit
held that adding a plaintiff whose claim would satisfy the jurisdictional
62306 U.S. 583 (1939). See also Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39
(1911) and Sco:t v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920), which were permissive joinder cases and
which considered only whether those plaintiffs appearing before the court were required to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Nor is Alvarez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 375
F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967), also cited by the Court, compelling
authority for the result reached in Zahn. None of the representative plaintiffs in Alvarez
satisfied the jurisdictional amount, so the facts are not analogous to Zab.
63The district court was convinced "to a legal certainty" that not every one of the two hun-
dred property owners had suffered damages in excess of $10,000. This would seem to imply
that some of the unnamed plaintiffs might have suffered damages in that amount. See 53
F.R.D. at 431.
64 It was asserted in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969), that Clark was a class
action. However, the Clark opinion does not refer to the action as a class action and the opin-
ion of the district court, Paul Gray, Inc. v. Ingels, 23 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1938), gives
no indication that the action was brought in a representative capacity. The action was com-
menced before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 586 n.1 (1939).
65The Court's emphasis in Clark on "separate and distinct demands" and "each separate
controversy," 306 U.S. at 589, renders Clark inapplicable to a properly brought 23(b)(3) class
action. See text accompanying notes 39 to 42 supra.
66 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
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amount could not confer jurisdiction over the parties.07 Hackner, there-
fore, dealt with jurisdiction over named plaintiffs with insufficient claims
and is on that basis alone distinguishable from Zahn. Moreover, the
Hackner court's reference to "adding a plaintiff" suggests that it may
have been concerned about the possibility that named plaintiffs might not
be legitimate members or representatives of the class. If this were the
basis of the court's decision, then the aggregation doctrine was misap.
plied. The power to regulate the composition and representation of a
class is given to the district judge by rule 23. Thus rule 23, not the
aggregation doctrine, would be the proper means of controlling partici-
pation in a class action. In Zahn there is no indication that any of
the named plaintiffs were added to the class to invoke jurisdiction, and,
unlike Hackner, the named Zahn plaintiffs each satisfied the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Hackner declares only that in a class suit the addi-
tion of a plaintiff who satisfies the jurisdictional amount requirement will
not confer jurisdiction upon the class when the original named plaintiffs
have not satisfied such requirement. The decision does not compel a
court to determine whether unnamed members of the class have satisfied
the jurisdictional amount when named members have done so.
As in Snyder, the Court in Zahn declined to re-examine its statutory
co'nstruction of "matter in controversy" because of Congressional re-enact-
ment of the jurisdictional statutes with the language unchanged. This
method of statutory interpretation, 8 however, is even less persuasive in
Zahn than it was in Svyder. The Court in Snyder believed that Congress
had implicitly enacted the judicial interpretation of "matter in contro-
versy" when it re-enacted the statute "against a background of judicial
interpretation that has consistently interpreted that congressionally en-
acted phrase as not encompassing the aggregation of separate and distinct
claims."0" Zahn was the first case in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a federal court had jurisdiction over a 23(b) (3) class when
each of the named plaintiffs individually satisfied the jurisdictional
amount. Therefore, Congress could not possibly have considered and
adopted the Court's interpretation of this novel situation when it last
re-enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in 1958.
D. The Distinction Between Named and Unnamed Plaintiffs
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in Zahn, stated that he
would dismiss an insufficient claim of a named plaintiff (as required by
07 Id. at 97-98.
108 See text accompanying notes 32 and 35-37 rupra.
09 394 U.S. at 339.
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Clark), but not of an unnamed plaintiff. It was his opinion that a district
court had jurisdiction to hear the claims of all the members of a class
if each of the representative plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional amount
requirement. This position was challenged by the majority,70 which
could find no justification for exempting unnamed plaintiffs from the
jurisdictional amount requirement if named plaintiffs were bound by it.
The Court's refusal to recognize a distinction between named and un-
named plaintiffs is curious, since it has previously endorsed such a distinc-
tion in resolving diversity of citizenship questions.
It is generally held that a federal court does not have jurisdiction
in a diversity case if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.71 But in Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,7 - the Court
distinguished between named plaintiffs and the unnamed members of the
plaintiff class on the issue of diversity of citizenship. It held that the
diversity requirement was satisfied, and the district court had jurisdiction,
as long as the named plaintiffs in the class were citizens of states other
than that of the defendant. This was true even though some unnamed
members of the class were citizens of the same state as the defendant.
Furthermore, the court's jurisdiction would not be destroyed even by in-
tervention of the non-diverse unnamed members of the class. Allowing
the unnamed plaintiffs to sue in the federal courts of their own state,
either by intervention or by virtue of the binding effect of the court's
decree, is clearly an exemption from the statutory diversity of citizenship
requirements. No explanation is given by the majority in Zahn why
the Ben-Hur approach would not be equally suitable for the matter in
controversy issue.
E. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The Court in Zahn stated that there was "no doubt" 73 that the ratio-
nale of Snyder controlled Zahn. But Snyder was concerned with the
question whether the district court had jurisdiction over the "action," and.
the Court there relied on a series of aggregation cases to conclude that
it did not. In Zahn, however, the Court had already determined that
it had subject matter jurisdiction; its main inquiry was directed at defining
the permissible extent of its jurisdiction. This is a question that can
be answered by reference to considerations wholly unrelated to the doc-
70 94 S. Ct. at 511 n.9.
7 1 Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
72255 U.S. 356 (1921).
7394 S. Ct. at 511.
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trine of aggregation. Therefore, it is submitted that Snyder does not
compel the result reached by the Court in Zahn.
The Zahn majority seems to have regarded the case as one that
turned on the aggregation issue, for it relied on a series of aggregation
decisions to reach its conclusion. However, since the crucial issue was
the extent of jurisdiction over claims of the various plaintiffs in the class,
an alternative approach was available to the Court which would have
permitted entertainment of the unnamed plaintiff's claims, but which
would not have made entertainment mandatory. Under the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction the district court, in its discretion, could have ad-
judicated the claims of the unnamed class members on the basis of ancil-
lary jurisdiction. This would have furthered the policy underlying
amended rule 23 by helping the small claimant to obtain redress for his
injuries.
The concept of ancillary jurisdiction, cited by the dissent in Zahtl,
but completely ignored by the majority,1 4 can be stated simply: When
a federal court properly has subject matter jurisdiction over a case or
controversy, it can properly exercise jurisdiction over related claims. In
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,15 the Supreme Court recognized the pow-
er of a federal court to adjudicate pendent or ancillary claims without
independent grounds of jurisdiction. In United Mine Workers, the
plaintiff had asserted a federal claim, establishing jurisdiction over the
"case." The Court held this empowered the district court to adjudicate
a companion state claim by means of pendent jurisdiction, even though
there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the state
claim. The Court established the requirement that the plaintiff's claims
be such "that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding,""6 and that the claims "derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact." 77
This policy of "resolving all issues involved in the subject matter
before the court"78 and of avoiding piecemeal litigation should be equally
applicable in the case of class actions. Claims which did not indepen-
dently satisfy the jurisdictional amount could be regarded as ancillary
74 The district judge felt bound by Snyder, but acknowledged that the ancillary jurisdiction
concept was an attractive idea that could be the basis of jurisdiction. Judge Timbers of the
Second Circuit, dissenting, vigorously argued that the insufficient claims should be within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the court. Finally, Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices
Douglas and Marshall, argued that the district court could, within its discretiop, have properly
exercised ancillary jurisdiction over all the insufficient claims.
75383 U.S. 715 (1966).
71 383 U.S. at 725.
71id.
78 Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdiction of Third Party Claims, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 326, 329
(1958).
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to the claims which invoke the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme
Court in Ben-Hur, for instance, permitted the exercise of ancillary juris-
diction over related claims not having an independent basis of federal
jurisdiction."9 More recently some lower federal courts have exercised
ancillary jurisdiction over claims asserted by parties joined under rule
20 when such claims did not have independent jurisdictional grounds.
Unquestionably the claims of all members of the class in Zahn "derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact," since they all assert that the
same actions of the defendant caused them injury. Further, if the district
court found, in accordance with rule 23, that class treatment was appro-
priate, this should be persuasive that the claims of the members of the
class were such that they would ordinarily be expected to try them in
a single judicial proceeding. The district court, in its discretion, could
have asserted ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plain-
tiffs whom the court believed did not independently satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement.
It could not properly be asserted that adjudicating related claims on
the basis of ancillary jurisdiction would always promote the goal of judi-
cial economy. Thus jurisdiction should not be automatically assumed.
The court has discretion to dismiss or entertain ancillary claims, and if
the ancillary claims would be overly burdensome because of many indi-
vidual questions not common to all the claims, then the district judge
should refuse to allow the action to proceed as a class action under rule
23 (b) (3).s But the majority in Zahn did not even mention the possibil-
ity of discretionary exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. The implication is
that the court does not intend that class action restrictions can be circum-
vented by the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
V. THE RULE 23 (B) (3) CLASS ACTION AFTER
ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.
A. General Implications of Zahn
It has frequently been stated by courts and commentators that one
of the major purposes of rule 23 is to provide a device for litigating
a large number of small but related claims.8 2 The costs of litigation
79 See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
80 See, e.g., General Research, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735
(W.D. Mich. 1968); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Mina. 1967). In neither
case did the claims of the joined parties exceed $10,000.
8 1 The judge must find that common questions predominate over individual questions not
common to the class before class action treatment can be permitted. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
82 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); Escot v. Bar-
chris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Dolgow
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and counsel ,can be prohibitive when only a small amount of damages
is sought. Sharing such costs is essential to the claimant whose potential
recovery is small but whose claim requires sophisticated scientific proof.
Moreover, when a group of small claims represents a substantial amount
of money, it is easier to attract superior counsel.
Under old rule 23, unnamed members of the class were required
to intervene if they desired to be included in the rule 23(a) (3) class
action judgment. This requirement of affirmative action has been elimi-
nated in the amended rule; now the claimant only need act if he wants
to be excluded from the judgment. Since a person with a small claim
would probably be the least likely to involve himself in a legal proceed-
ing, it has been asserted that elimination of the intervention requirement
is convincing evidence that the dominant motive of the revising of rule
23 was to make it easier for the small claimant to obtain redress for
his injury. 3
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder and Zahn, relief can
be obtained by small claimants in the federal courts only if jurisdiction
can be based on a statute not requiring a jurisdictional amount or if
the class can convince the court that the rights sought to be enforced
are joint or common.84  Thus many class actions in the federal courts
are precluded by these cases, and many smaller claims will probably go
unredressed.
The litigation costs to the defendant in Zahn could clearly have been
minimized if all the claims against it could have been adjudicated in
the same proceeding. However, the Zahn defendant opposed the use
of a class action, apparently on the conviction that denial of a class action
would result in some of the smaller claimants not being able to proceed
with their claims at all for financial reasons. While many states permit
some kind of class action, most are not as effective a procedural tool
as the federal class action.85 The Zahn rule therefore presents a defen-
dant with a significant procedural advantage.
There are other problems created by the Zabn decision. In Zahn
the named plaintiffs had already indicated a preference to try their cases
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLBR, FtID1RAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756 (1972); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device lor Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 501 (1969); Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to the Class
Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IN. & COM. L. Rnv. 497 (1969).
83 Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM,
L. REV. 501, 507 (1969).
84The Court noted in Zahn that its decision would apply is well when jurisdiction was
based on 28 U.S.C. 1331. 94S. Ct. at512 n.11.
85 See Starts, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1I. Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.
L. REv. 407, 469 (1969).
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in federal court, as is their right under the jurisdictional statute. Others
could possibly have sought relief in the courts of Vermont, either as a
class or individually. But this would have created a risk of inconsistent
adjudications and while the federal court must apply state law to the
dispute,8 6 if there is no applicable state precedent the federal court must
decide the case as they think it would be decided by the highest state
court.s7 The state courts subsequently could reach a different result with
respect to another member of the class. The opportunity to adjudicate
all the claims of the class in a single proceeding in federal court would
help to eliminate the possibility of such inconsistency. A single state
proceeding would achieve the same consistency but, with federal diversity
jurisdiction available, some of those who meet the requirements might
prefer to litigate their claims in federal court. Thus no one proceeding
would ever determine the rights of all interested persons. In addition
to increased costs to all parties, the multiple litigation caused by Zahn
results in an uneconomical use of judicial resources-the fragmenting
of the litigation will probably require that the alleged wrongdoing of
the defendant be proved many times over.
B. Impact on Environmental Litigation
The complaint in Zahn was based on claims arising under state law.
Today such a complaint would probably state a federal cause of actions8
and jurisdiction could be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal
question statute. While this would not have caused a different result
in Zahn, since § 1331 has the same jurisdictional amount requirement
as § 13 32,s it may make a difference in the future. The American
Law Institute has recommended that the minimum jurisdictional amount
requirement be eliminated from the general federal question jurisdictional
statute' While the Institute would retain the minimum amount re-
quirement for diversity jurisdiction, it recommends that § 1331 be
brought in line with the special federal question jurisdictional statutes
in order to provide a federal forum for all claims based on federal law.
Since an environmental pollution claim may now be brought as a federal
86 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87 Certification to a state court for resolution of the controlling questions of law might, of
course, be available in some situations.
88 SeeIllinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1962) (federal cause of action for pollu-
tion of interstate waterway).
89 See note 84, supr.
90 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (Washington, D.C. 1965, 1968).
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cause of an action,91 the A.L.I.'s proposed change in the jurisdictional
statute would be extremely beneficial to environmental litigants. Because
of Zahn, the jurisdictional amount requiremenrs present virtually insur-
mountable obstacles to a class action seeking damages. It is highly un-
likely that many classes -will be found for such cases in which every
member will have suffered $10,000 worth of damages, and the difficulties
of identifying a class based on amount of damages would probably out-
weigh the advantages of the class action.
Environmental issues have become emotionally charged in recent
years, and public opinion has been aroused. The class action has been
said to be similar to a mass street demonstration because it is an effec-
tive means of bringing the litigants' problem or cause to the attention
of the public.92 The proposed change in § 1331, by circumventing the
obstacles presently raised by the Zahn decision, would greatly assist envir-
onmentalists in eliciting public support for environmental issues.
C. Potential Effect on the Consumer Movement
Although Zahn dealt with claims relating to pollution of the environ-
ment, the decision was a blow to the consumer movement as well. At-
tempts to bring class actions on behalf of large numbers of consumers
have encountered difficulties unrelated to the amount in controversy.
Some courts have held that classes of thousands or even millions of con-
sumers would be unmanageable and have denied class action treatment
on that basis. 93 Today, if federal jurisdiction must be based on diversity
of citizenship or on a general federal question, Snyder and Zahn stand
as a complete bar to a class action for damages. The injured consumer
is likely to have a monetary claim which could not justify the cost of
individual litigation. A merchant or manufacturer who has wrongfully
injured a large number of consumers should not be allowed to escape
responsibility because the legal system is too expensive to be used by
the consumers individually. The class action is an effective remedy. As
with environmental causes, the consumer movement requires mobilization
of public opinion, and this makes the class action, which attracts public
attention, a vital tool.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris and Zahn
91 See note 89 supra.
92 Starts, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.UL.
REV. 407,408 (1969).
9 3 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 73-74 (D. N.J, 1971);
United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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v. International Paper Co. were not compelled by statute or precedent.
The opposite results would have been analytically supportable and would
have promoted the goals of class actions-specifically, judicial economy
and redress of multiple small claims. At this point the only escape from
Snyder and Zahn under §§ 1331 and 1332 is to structure the action
in such a way that the district court can find that the rights asserted
are joint or common. A judge sympathetic to the goals of class actions
may give the plaintiffs'the benefit of the doubt in a close case, but in
view of the Supreme Court's unsympathetic reception of class actions,
substantial relief can be guaranteed only by legislation. As noted
aboveY4 the proposed elimination of the matter in controversy require-
ment in general federal question cases would be of substantial help in
some areas. With respect to diversity jurisdiction, Congress should speci-
fically authorize either aggregation or ancillary jurisdiction or both in
rule 23 (b) (3) class actions, but raise the minimum jurisdictional amount
required for such actions to, perhaps, $100,000. This would insure that the
federal courts continue to devote their time to "substantial controversies."
Edward S. Ginsburg
94 See text accompanying note 91 sapra.
